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Abstract
A country’s economic prosperity is intimately linked to the external and internal
forces that exert influences on its economy. While some of these forces may not be
under the overt control of the country’s economic planners, any disruption to the
economy by these forces may just tip the balance that causes financial hardship to
millions of people. Certainly, national governments through fiscal and monetary
policy measures may attempt to prevent such a catastrophe, but what happens if at
such a critical time, the needed government leadership is suddenly not available? In
such a situation, what will be the most appropriate reaction from the central bank
and what is the likely effect to the country’s banking industry? While this scenario
might sound like an interesting thought experiment in a banking classroom, a
similar situation is in fact unfolding in real life at this very moment in Malaysia.
Keywords: Malaysian banking, Malaysian economy, Bank Negara Malaysia, Brexit,
trade wars, China, USA, New Malaysia, economic uncertainties, recession, credit
risk, repayment risk, Corona virus, Malaysian politics
1. Introduction
2018 was a period of interesting change in Malaysia. The General Election held
on May 9 resulted in the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, which has held
power in the country ever since Malaysia’s independence in 1957, being voted out of
power. In its place, the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition formed the new Malaysian
government. It seemed that the unprecedented change of government also brought
a new wave of hope for the Malaysian people. The Malaysian economy grew above
market expectations in the fourth quarter of 2018, buoyed by strong domestic
activities which grew 5.6% along with total external trade that grew at 6.9% [1].
This was excellent news for the people, as earlier in the year in March 2018,
there appeared to be a looming threat of a full-on trade war between the United
States and China. China is Malaysia’s second largest trade partner at 13%, and 9% of
Malaysian trade is with the United States, its third largest trade partner, respec-
tively [2]. Worries about the trade war between these two countries had already
caused Asian markets in general to trade lower—the KLCI (Kuala Lumpur Com-
posite Index) dropped 0.6% to 1865.22 points, and Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index
dropped 2.5% to 30, 309.29 points after US and China announced tariffs on each
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other on 26 March 2018 [3]. Despite the threat of a trade war, there were potential
benefits for Malaysia. It was thought that China may scale back purchases of US
Treasury bonds, and divert capital flows to Ringgit assets, which will be beneficial
to Malaysian Government Securities’ yields [2]. There is even the possibility that
the price of oil, a key Malaysian export, will increase as a result of the trade war [2].
Indeed, by the fourth quarter of 2018, most Malaysians had a positive outlook on
their personal finances and job prospects, with 70% of Malaysians believing that the
state of personal finances in the next year would be excellent or good, and 71% had a
positive view of their job prospects [4].
However, this positive mood had declined by the second quarter of 2019, with
only 63% of Malaysians believing that the state of personal finances in the next year
would be excellent or good, and 63% had a positive view of their job prospects [5].
In Ref., [5] also found that 70% of the Malaysian consumers already believed that
the country was already in economic recession. In response, the central bank of
Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) signaled the banking industry that they
should continue to give out more loans by reducing the Statutory Reserve Require-
ment (SRR) Ratio to 3% from 16 November 2019 [6]. This is the latest series of SRR
ratio reduction by BNM, which started in 2016, when the central bank reduced the
SRR from 4 to 3.5% [7]. This message was reinforced by BNM on 22 January 2020,
when the Monetary Policy Committee of Bank Negara announced the reduction of
the Overnight Policy Rate (OPR) to 2.75%, and considered the adjustment to the
OPR as a pre-emptive measure to secure economic growth with price stability [8].
What had happened to Malaysia between 2018 and 2019 timeframe that had
caused such a drastic change in its perceived economic fortunes is a point of conjec-
ture at this time, but several external forces will be discussed here, which cumula-
tively, may explain the present situation that Malaysia has found herself in. Further,
the recent shocking developments in the political scene in Malaysia on 24 February
2020 also add turmoil to the present situation of economic uncertainty. Through it all
stands the Malaysian banker, duty bound to protect the interests of their respective
employers, and at the same time fully aware that should they be too careful, they may
just doom the country to another economic recession that they have tried so hard to
avoid. Conversely, BNM is counting on the banking industry to continue to provide
the necessary funds for economic activities despite the heightened risk of non-
performing loans and the negative impacts this will have on the banking industry. It
would almost seem that the BNM appears to be willing to expose the banking indus-
try to more risks in order to protect the Malaysian economy.
2. Capital and lending
Giving loans has always been an integral part of banking operations [9]. In 2018,
CIMB Group, Malaysia’s second largest commercial bank by assets, recorded that its
gross loans account for 63% of its total assets and Maybank, Malaysia’s largest
commercial bank with over 20 million customers, recorded that its gross loans in
2018 is 62.8% over its total assets [10]. This shows the importance of lending to
banks, as it is the most important income generating activity to banks [11]. Banks
would evaluate potential customers, and then decide the level of risk such a loan
would impose, charge the appropriate interest and disburse the amount requested,
while ensuring that the capital borrowed is returned over the agreed time-frame of
the loan. The interest charged will then yield interest income to the banks. How-
ever, there are instances when the borrower defaults on paying back the loan, and
this causes the lending bank to suffer financial loss, as their income will be affected
and potentially there is a danger that the capital loaned may be lost as well.
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This was the case in Malaysia during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998,
when cases of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs)/Impared Loans (as expressed as the
ratio of net impaired loans to net total loans in percentage) reached 8–9% [12].
Because of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, growth and innovation in Malaysia are
constrained by banks whose capital has been eroded by accumulating non-
performing loans [13]. This leads to the mergers of several banks that shaped the
banking industry to the one that we see in Malaysia today [14].
Therefore, it is clear that anything that affects the banking sector’s lending
activity will adversely affect the income of the banks. The factors that may affect
such activities may be divided into two types of factors, internal factors (bank
specific factors), and external factors like the economic climate or political climate.
By its nature, external factors may not be readily controlled by the bank [14]. This
makes it harder for banks to maintain profitable lending. Malaysian banks loan
growth remained low at 5% as of June 2018, due to the poor performance of
working capital loans [15] and loan growth was projected to remain flat at 5–6%
level in 2019 [16]. The external factors are discussed next.
2.1 Brexit and Malaysia
Brexit is a portmanteau for ‘Britain’ and ‘Exit’, following a referendum in the
United Kingdom (UK) that resulted in London, Scotland and Northern Ireland
electing to remain in the European Union (EU) while the rest of England and Wales
deciding to leave the EU [17]. Following [18], there is little short-term impact of
Brexit to Malaysia. The UK is not a large trading partner of Malaysia, and despite
UK’s status as the financial center of Europe, any impact of Brexit will not have a big
effect to Malaysian financial markets [18]. In fact, the weakened British Pound
(GBP) will even make the UK a favourable destination for Malaysian students, and
well-to-do Malaysians may even find it a good time to holiday there or to buy
properties in the UK. This view is echoed by [19], despite the UK contributing RM
1.9 billion worth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) while the EU invested RM 30.3
billion in the same period in 2016, and estimated that Brexit will not affect FDI to
Malaysia.
However, Brexit’s effect on the UK economy is expected to be not so benign.
Following [20], a recession in the UK is a strong possibility. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has already predicted the UK
economy to grow at only 1% in 2020. An impending economic recession in the UK
will have a negative impact on the EU, since half of the UK’s imports come from the
EU. In addition, with a general slowdown in the global economy caused by insta-
bility in global trade due to trade spats, the OEDC concludes that it is likely to
dampen the EU’s growth rate to about 1% as well in 2020 [20].
Given that Malaysian trade with the EU is about 10%, a weaker EU economy will
impact the Malaysian economy in general. Further, with the expected weakening of
the GBP against the Ringgit, Malaysian exports to the UK, already at a tiny 0.2% of
total exports, will increasingly become less competitive in the UK market [20].
These events do not bode well for the Malaysian economy.
2.2 US-China trade war
Malaysia has always been a trading nation, and international trade has consis-
tently contributed to the Malaysian gross domestic product (GDP), and since 2017
its share of contribution to the GDP was higher than 130% [21]. Following [21],
there is concern that the Malaysian economy will shift into lower gear on fears of a
gloomier global economic outlook. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had
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already reduced its 2019 forecast for the ASEAN region from 3.9 to 3.7%. Echoing a
similar sentiment, the Asian Development Bank has put the region’s growth rate
expectation at 5.8%. The sole underlying cause that contributed to these downward
revisions is the US-China trade war.
As discussed earlier, the US and China are two of Malaysia’s largest trade part-
ners. Therefore, any trade policies that harm trade between these countries could
affect Malaysia’s trade position, especially when Malaysia’s intermediate goods
exports to China are significant [21]. Further, the weakening global markets will
impact demand for electronics, one of the key Malaysian exports. Palm oil demand
is also expected to fall, as does the price of oil [21].
The slowdown in exports will result in the narrowing of the Malaysian current
account surpluses [21] as well, giving the Malaysian government less money to spend
on fiscal measures to stimulate the economy. Indeed, the 2020 Malaysian economic
growth forecast had been continually downgraded, with Finch Solutions predicting
only 3.7% expansion, down from an earlier projection of 4.7% [22]. To navigate the
difficult economic situation, it is vital for the Malaysian government to establish
forward-looking policies. Thus far, it appears to be contented to rely on BNM to apply
monetary policies to shore up the economy. This may soon be insufficient.
2.3 New Malaysia
When the Pakatan Harapan (PH) party took over the reins of power after the
2018 General Election, Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad was made Prime Minister with
an understanding that there will be a transition plan for Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim to
succeed him mid-term [23]. However, the PH government collapsed on Monday 24
February 2020 by Tun Dr. Mahathir’s shock resignation as Prime Minister. Tun Dr.
Mahathir’s resignation was speculated to be caused by a power struggle between the
Prime Minister and his planned successor [22]. Economists quickly opined that the
political uncertainty this has caused is harmful to the Malaysian economy [22].
The resignation by a country’s Prime Minister at any time during the tenure of a
government has the effect of causing the entire cabinet to be dissolved [24]. Effec-
tively, Malaysia does not have a government anymore. Unfortunately, the dissolu-
tion of the Malaysian government cannot come at a worse time, as in the past few
months, an additional threat to the Malaysian economy had emerged in the form of
a novel corona virus, called Covid-19 [25]. While Covid-19 is currently under
control, the disease has already caused a huge impact on the global economy, and
Malaysia’s economy has not been spared [25]. Accordingly, the Malaysian govern-
ment was scheduled to announce an economic stimulus package to stimulate the
economy on 27 February 2020. Unfortunately, the sudden resignation of the Prime
Minister on 24 February 2020 has caused fears that the stimulus package has been
put on hold [22, 25]. Indeed, this was stated by the former Finance Minister Lim
Guan Eng on 25 February 2020 that Tun Dr. Mahathir will announce the economic
stimulus at a later date [26].
Unease about the political uncertainty arising from a suddenly-defunct govern-
ment and its possible effect on the Malaysian economy prompted BNM to announce
on 25 February 2020 that it was closely monitoring the financial markets, and stated
that there was sufficient liquidity in the financial markets [27]. The political situa-
tion had settled down somewhat by the 27th of February 2020, with Tun Dr.
Mahathir appointed Interim Prime Minister. The irony of his actions now fully
realized, Tun Dr. Mahathir had stated that he had intended to resign from his job,
but now only he among his cabinet colleagues still had one.
As such, Tun Dr. Mahathir was able to announce the anxiously awaited eco-
nomic stimulus on 27 February 2020. The economic stimulus package has three
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strategies—to manage the impact of Covid-19, spur a people-centric growth and
encourage quality investment. With immediate effect, government employees who
are in medical profession will receive an extra allowance of RM 400 a month, while
Immigration and other civil servants involved with the fight against Covid-19 will
receive RM 200 extra monthly, until the outbreak is over [25].
The effectiveness of the stimulus package to counter the effects of Covid-19
remains to be seen. Goldman Sachs warned that it does not expect US companies to
generate earnings growth in 2020 due to the Covid-19 virus [28]. It also expected
that a more severe pandemic would lead to a more prolonged disruption and even a
US recession. Goldman Sachs also expected a severe decline in the Chinese eco-
nomic activities as well [28]. Indeed, blue chip US companies like Microsoft, Apple,
Booking Holdings and Anheuser-Busch InBev are already reporting that they no
longer expect to meet revenue targets due to Covid-19 [28, 29].
With Malaysia’s major trading partners expected to experience economic trou-
bles, the Malaysian economy is expected to experience significant challenges going
forward. Following [30], the Malaysian economic growth rate is expected to be
2.5% at the end of the first quarter of 2020. It is expected to slowly recover to 4.4%
by the same time period next year [30]. How does this data on economic perfor-
mance affect Malaysian bankers?
2.4 Malaysian banking
Following [11], economic and political factors have the potential to adversely
affect the banking sector’s lending activity and this will adversely affect the income
of the banks. Consumer lending risks can be moderated by banks using computer-
ized credit reporting as provided by CTOS Data Systems Sdn Bhd and BNM. CTOS
produces the MyCTOS Basic Report and MyCTOS Score Report by using informa-
tion sourced from various public sources such as the National Registration Depart-
ment, Registrar of Societies, the Malaysian Insolvency Department, Companies
Commission of Malaysia and publication of legal proceedings or litigation records
[31]. BNM also provides credit reports and this is managed by the Credit Bureau of
BNM, known as the Central Credit Reference Information System (CCRIS). CCRIS
gathers credit related information from all borrowers of participating financial
institutions in Malaysia, and this includes all licensed commercial banks, Islamic
banks, investment banks, development financial institutions, insurance companies,
payment instrument issuers, rehabilitation companies, building societies, credit
leasing companies and government agencies. These financial institutions are
required to report on a regular basis information like profiles of borrowers (name,
business or personal identification number, date of birth/registration, and address,
among others) credit application details (amount of borrowing applied, date of
application, type of facility) and credit account details (type of credit facilities,
credit limit, outstanding balance, instalment amount, conduct of account and legal
action status, if any) [31].
Therefore, it is possible for financial institutions in Malaysia to access up-to-date
financial records for any potential individual borrower and assess the suitability of
lending risk by obtaining CCRIS or CTOS financial data. Even so, despite such a
system in place, banks continue to suffer cases of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs)/
Impaired Loans. Data from BNM show the ratio of net impaired loans to net total
loans in percentage [32] of a high of 9% in November 1998 to a low of 1.2% in
January 2016, with this figure hovering around 1.2% throughout 2015. While the
reduction of impaired loans since 1998 has been significant, the banking industry
has seemingly been unable to completely eradicate impaired loans/NPLs. As a result
of this inability, the collective impairment provisions that has to be made to account
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for the impaired loans totaled in the region of RM 16,354 million in January 2016
alone, and this figure increased to RM 23, 914.4 million in February 2019, even
though the ratio of net impaired loans to net total loans in percentage has been
reduced to 0.93% by February 2019. Credit scoring methods are by nature quanti-
tative methods of evaluating credit and are only as good as the scoring algorithms
that predict consumer behavior. If it is implemented properly, then cases of
impaired loans should not have happened at all.
More worryingly for bankers, such a system does not exist for another important
consumer group of lending, small to medium sized Industries (SMEs). SMEs con-
tribute one third of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This has
increased to 37.1% in 2018 [11] and comprises 97% of all formal business establish-
ments in Malaysia. SMEs employ 66% of the Malaysian workforce as of 2018 and
BNM also believes that SMEs have the potential to contribute more to the Malaysian
economy. It is expected that by the year 2020, SMEs contribution to the Malaysian
GDP will increase to 41% [11]. Also, financial institutions like banks are the main
source of financing for SMEs, and lending to SMEs constitute almost half of the total
sum of the financial institutions lending to the business sector [11]. The financing
approval rate from financial institutions has exceeded 80%, with the financing
approval rate reaching 91% in 2019. As of February 2018, there was still RM 3.3
billion still available to SMEs to use for working capital and for buying machinery
[11]. However, the higher loan approval rates to SMEs have also had some
unintended consequences to financial institutions, which showed an increase in
NPLs from the business sector in 2019 [11] (Figure 1).
Following [33], an increase in NPLs will affect the bank’s profitability and
liquidity which are the main components for the efficiency of the bank. There has
been some research to find methods to mitigate this by using non-quantitative
methods by analyzing the SME sales officers’ psychological factors [11–14] as well
as their past experiences [34]. Indeed, since there is no computerized credit analysis
available for SMEs, banks have been forced to approach loan applications by SMEs
using a case-by-case approach, where a personalized banking style is adopted. This
makes the case for understanding how an individual bank sales officer approaches a
lending case very relevant in order to minimize NPLs.
3. Conclusion
The global economic events of Brexit and the US-China Trade War in the last
few years along with the unanticipated Covid-19 pandemic are still influencing the
Figure 1.
Malaysian banking NPL. source: BNM.
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Malaysian economy, and as a result, it poses great credit risks to Malaysian banks.
One might even be tempted to call this a “perfect storm” for the banking industry.
The surprise political events of 24 February 2020 had just magnified those risks.
Faced with a lack of governmental fiscal policy, BNM must rely on the tools it has
on hand to get on with the task of protecting the Malaysian economy. It is expected
that BNM will soon be forced to further reduce the OPR yet again [35]. This will
mean that Malaysian banks’ interest income, already under strain, will be further
reduced. Even so, the BNM is fast running out of options. As an analogy, if BNM
was an archer, its two quivers of OPR and SRR is running out of arrows. It is clear
that BNM cannot prevent an economic disaster on its own. However, for Malaysian
bankers, a time of hardship is just beginning.
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